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Abstract
We set up a model of generalised oligopoly where two countries of different
size compete for an exogenous, but variable, number of identical firms. The model
combines a desire by national governments to attract internationally mobile firms
with the existence of location rents that arise even in a symmetric equilibrium
where firms are dispersed. As economic integration proceeds, equilibrium taxes
decline, switching from positive to negative levels, and then rise as trade costs
fall even further. A range of trade costs is identified where economic integration
raises the welfare of the small country, but lowers welfare in the large country.
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1 Introduction
The rise in foreign direct investment and the increasing role played by large, multina-
tional firms have been amongst the most important developments in the world economy
over the last three decades. These changes have had profound effects on the overall
stance that governments have taken towards the location of mobile firms in their juris-
dictions. This is reflected in the policies adopted to influence the investment decisions
of these firms.
One policy area where these developments can be seen is in corporate taxation. Ta-
ble 1 shows that nominal and effective average rates of corporation tax have fallen
significantly over the last two decades. Moreover the figures in the table are likely to
overestimate the taxes actually paid by mobile, multinational firms. Hines (2005), for
example, presents evidence that the effective tax rates paid by U.S.-based multination-
als have fallen more strongly during the period 1982-1999 than their host countries’
statutory tax rates. This indicates that multinationals have been able to shift part of
their profits to low-cost countries, or that they receive specific tax breaks in the host
countries (or both).1
A second policy area where an increased “bargaining power” of mobile firms vis-a`-vis
host governments appears is state aid for the location of new plants or the expansion
of existing ones. Such investment subsidies have become commonplace, in particu-
lar in sectors that combine the use of modern technologies with the creation of new
jobs. This is well documented in the European Union (EU), where state aid given by
member states to individual enterprises in their jurisdiction must be approved by the
European Commission. Table 2 lists 15 cases in the years 2001-2004 alone where sub-
stantial investment subsidies, typically accounting for 10-30% of the present value of
the investment, have been approved by the EU Commission.2
1There is growing empirical evidence for profit shifting by multinationals; see Hines (1999) for a
survey. Discriminatory tax breaks granted to multinational firms are a major current policy issue at
both the OECD and the EU level. The EU’s Primarolo Report (1999) and the OECD (2000) list many
examples of discriminatory tax preferences in favour of multinational enterprises.
2Note that the subsidy payments collected in Table 2 cover only direct monetary transfers and
thus represent merely a lower bound for the overall value of the incentive package. The latter often
includes additional measures, such as the free provision of public infrastructure. See Davies (2005,
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Table 1: Corporate taxation in OECD countries
statutory effective
tax ratea average tax rateb
1985 1995 2005 1985 1995 2005
large countries (> 20 million)
Australia 50 36 30 37 31 26
Canada 45 36 36 28 28 28
France 50 37 34 34 27 25
Germany 63 57 38 45 41 32
Italy 46 52 37 31 36 26
Japan 56 50 40 45 40 32
Spain 35 35 35 27 24 26
United Kingdom 40 33 30 28 26 24
United States 50 39 39 32 29 29
∅ large countriesc 48.3 41.7 35.4 34.1 31.3 27.6
small countries (< 20 million)
Austria 61 34 25 37 24 22
Belgium 45 40 34 35 31 26
Finland 60 25 26 45 19 21
Greece 44 40 32 36 33 21
Ireland 10 10 13 5 8 11
Netherlands 43 35 32 34 28 25
Norway 51 28 28 36 24 24
Portugal 55 40 28 48 29 20
Sweden 60 28 28 45 21 21
Switzerland 35 35 34 26 26 25
∅ small countriesc 46.4 31.5 28.0 34.7 24.3 21.6
∅ all countriesc 47.3 36.3 31.5 34.4 27.6 24.4
a including local taxes
b base case: real discount rate: 10%, inflation rate: 3.5%, depreciation rate: 12.25%, rate of
economic rent: 10% (financial return: 20%)
c unweighted average
Source: Devereux et al. (2002)
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Table 2: Approved investment subsidies in EU member states (2001-2004)
Date of Host country State aid Aid inten-
Company (sectora) approval (city/region) (million eb) sity (%)c
Nissan 01/2001 U.K. (Sunderland) 60 18.6
Volkswagen 07/2001 Germany (Dresden) 75 12.3
Daimler Chrysler 12/2001 Germany (Thuringia) 57 30.9
Infineon (semiconductors) 04/2002 Germany (Saxony) 219 19.8
ST Microelectronics 04/2002 Italy (Sicily) 542 26.3
Renault 06/2002 Spain (Valladolid) 18 14.3
Vauxhall 09/2002 U.K. (Ellesmere Port) 15 6.4
Iveco (utility vehicles) 10/2002 Italy (Puglia) 109 44.0
BMW 12/2002 Germany (Leipzig) 363 30.1
Solar World (solar cells) 03/2003 Germany (Saxony) 73 35.0
BMW 05/2003 Austria (Steyr) 16 15.3
Volkswagen 06/2003 Spain (Navarra) 20 6.4
AMD (microelectronics) 02/2004 Germany (Saxony) 545d 22.7d
DHL Airways (logistics) 04/2004 Germany (Leipzig) 70 28.0
Peugeot Citroen 09/2004 U.K. (Ryton) 30 9.8
a automobiles, unless otherwise stated b 1 British Pound is converted to 1.5 €
c present value of state aid divided by present value of investment d upper limit
Source: Official Journal of the European Communities, C and L (http://eur-lex.europa.eu)
In the present paper we take an integrated view of these simultaneous developments.
If investment subsidies and corporate tax payments are viewed together and compared
in present-value terms, in many cases it is not clear whether firms actually make net
tax payments to their host countries or if, instead, governments pay mobile firms to
locate within their jurisdictions. Therefore one of the main goals of our analysis is
to identify the conditions in equilibrium under which payments flow from firms to
countries and when the reverse occurs. We do so in a model that incorporates a desire
on the part of national governments to attract internationally mobile firms, but also
gives governments the ability to tax the location rents earned by firms.
More specifically, we set up a model of generalised oligopoly where two countries com-
Table 1) for a similar collection of investment subsidies granted by the U.S. states.
3
pete for an exogenous, but variable, number of identical firms. Governments want to
attract firms to their jurisdiction in order to save on trade costs and thereby reduce
consumer prices. This gives them an incentive to offer subsidies to mobile firms. At
the same time, there are location rents for the firms. These arise because any firm that
moves from one country to the other will face a different number of firms in its new
location, and the changed competitive environment will affect its profits. There is a
positive location rent if such a firm would suffer a fall in profits from moving out of its
current location and the host government has an opportunity to grab this rent through
taxes. Whether taxes are positive or negative in the location equilibrium depends on
the interplay of these two forces. Our model is simple enough to allow us to derive
reduced-form expressions for the equilibrium tax rates on mobile firms, even in the
case where countries are of asymmetric size. A core question raised in our analysis is
how economic integration (a fall in trade costs) affects tax rates and welfare in the
large and in the small country. We find that equilibrium tax rates in both countries
are positive at high levels of trade costs, then fall to negative values (i.e. location sub-
sidies) as economic integration proceeds, and finally rise again when trade costs fall
even further. Similarly welfare levels are first falling and then rising again when trade
costs are continuously reduced. Importantly, there is a range of trade costs where eco-
nomic integration raises the welfare of the small country, but lowers welfare in the large
country.
Our model is related to two strands in the literature that have so far developed inde-
pendently, and have led to rather different conclusions. A first set of papers focuses
on the competition of potential host countries for a single multinational firm. In these
models the equilibrium policy generally involves a location subsidy to the firm. Rea-
sons why countries (or states) will want to attract firms include: scale economies in
the provision of public goods and services, in conjunction with a mobile workforce
(Black and Hoyt, 1989); positive spillovers from employment in the host jurisdiction
(Haaparanta, 1996; Davies, 2005); savings in trade costs (Haufler and Wooton, 1999);
or technological backwardness (Fumagalli, 2003). Recent work has shown, however,
that these results change when an indigenous firm is already operating in one of the
countries (Bjorvatn and Eckel, 2006) or when countries compete for two mobile firms,
rather than one (Ferrett and Wooton, 2005). In the latter case countries may even be
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able to tax away all profits in the non-cooperative tax equilibrium. A general feature
of these models is that they involve the comparison of discrete equilibrium allocations
and analyse specific scenarios that are difficult to compare or generalise.
A second literature strand has analysed tax competition for internationally mobile firms
in models of the new economic geography (Kind et al., 2000; Baldwin and Krugman,
2004; Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 2005; Borck and Pflu¨ger, 2006). These models em-
ploy a framework of monopolistic competition where otherwise identical firms produce
different varieties of a composite good.3 This literature has stressed that agglomeration
rents can be taxed, at positive levels, by the government of a ‘core country’. However,
this result applies only in the special case where all firms are agglomerated in one
country, whereas subsidies are paid in equilibrium when firms are regionally dispersed.
In contrast the present model focuses only on interior location equilibria and shows
that positive tax rates can arise even if firms are fully dispersed in equilibrium.
Our analysis develops as follows. In section 2 we present the basic model. Section 3
analyses the non-cooperative tax equilibrium and the allocation of firms in the case
where countries are symmetric and in the case where they differ in size. Section 4
analyses the welfare effects of economic integration, again differentiating between the
scenarios of symmetric and of asymmetric countries. In section 5 we analyse the ro-
bustness of our results by incorporating profit income and an excess burden of taxation
into the objective function of national governments. Section 6 discusses the results and
relates them to the existing literature. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Consumers
We consider a region with two countries a and b, which compete to attract a fixed num-
ber of firms. These firms produce an homogeneous good, labelled x, in an oligopolistic
industry. A second, private good, the numeraire commodity z, is produced under con-
3For an extension that accounts for firm heterogeneity, see Burbidge et al. (2006). Another related
analysis is Fuest (2005) who studies the implications for tax policy when economic integration reduces
trade barriers but also increases the foreign ownership share of domestic firms.
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ditions of perfect competition. Consumers in both countries have identical preferences
for the goods, given by
ui = αxi − β
2
x2h + z, i ∈ {a, b}. (1)
The two countries potentially differ in size. The population of the region is normalised
to unity and, without loss of generality, we take country a to be the larger of the two.
Let there be n ≥ 0.5 consumers in country a and (1 − n) consumers in country b. In
most of our analysis, the residents of countries a and b earn only wage income, while
profit income accrues to capital owners that reside in a third (outside) country.4 Every
household in the region supplies a single unit of labour. The wage rate in each country
is determined in the numeraire industry, which uses labour as the only input. Free
trade in the numeraire good therefore equalises the wage across the countries as w.
Moreover, total income from the business tax (as detailed below), denoted by Ti, is
redistributed equally and in a lump-sum fashion to the consumers in each country. The
budget constraint for a representative consumer in each of the two countries is then
w +
Ta
n
= z + paxa, w +
Tb
1− n = z + pbxb, (2)
where pi is the price of good x in country i. Utility maximisation leads to the inverse-
demand curves
α− βxi = pi, i ∈ {a, b}. (3)
Aggregating the demand for good x over all consumers yields market demand curves
for each country, denoted Xi
Xa =
n(α− pa)
β
, Xb =
(1− n)(α− pb)
β
. (4)
When n > 0.5, the market demand curve of the larger country a is flatter than that
of country b. In this sense market a is the more profitable one for firms, as we will see
below.
2.2 Firms
Each firm in the imperfectly competitive industry x requires one unit of capital to
produce any output. There is a total of k units of capital in the world economy, implying
4In section 5 we will consider the more general case where all profit income accrues to the residents
of countries a and b.
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that a maximum of k firms can engage in production.5 There are fixed and identical
costs of setting up operations in each of the two countries. This ensures that each firm
will locate in only one country, if it enters the region at all.6 The firms are assumed to
be identical except with respect to the location of their production facilities. Location
matters because, while all firms can sell their products in both countries, there are
trade costs associated with exports to a firm’s foreign market. Thus each country may
be served by both “local” firms that produce domestically and “foreign” firms that are
based in the other country.
We assume that labour is the only variable input. Each unit of output requires the
efforts of a single worker and hence the marginal cost is w.7 The cost of exporting each
unit of output is τ , which effectively raises the marginal cost of serving the foreign
market to (w + τ). Firms are assumed to behave as Cournot competitors and are able
to segment their markets, choosing the quantities to sell on their domestic and export
markets independently.8
Capital owners choose output levels in each market in order to maximise the total
profit of each firm (which equals the return to capital) :
pia = (pa − w)xaa + (pb − w − τ) xba,
pib = (pa − w − τ) xab + (pb − w) xbb,
(5)
where pij is the pre-tax profit of a firm based in country j and xij represents sales in
country i by a firm based in country j (i, j ∈ {a, b}). Given that the marginal cost of
exports is relatively higher than that for domestic sales, a firm’s perceived marginal
revenue in its export market must be comparably larger. In equilibrium, this will arise
5Our model treats k as a continuous variable. Hence the analysis only approximates the “true”
model when the number of firms is small and the relocation of a single firm has discrete implications
for the equilibrium allocation. This will be further discussed in section 6. The main advantage of
this procedure is that we can derive equilibrium allocations and policies as continuous functions of
exogenous model parameters.
6For notational simplicity these fixed costs are suppressed in the equations below.
7Since wage costs are equalised between the two countries, they do not enter the location decision
of firms in our model. For a recent analysis of tax competition for foreign direct investment which
focuses on production cost differentials, see Davies (2005).
8In equilibrium, firms will receive a lower producer price for their exports than for goods destined
for the domestic market. The trade structure is simply a generalisation of the “reciprocal dumping”
model of Brander and Krugman (1983).
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when each foreign firm has a relatively smaller market share than that of a domestic
firm (as perceived marginal revenue is inversely related to market share). Essentially, a
firm is at a cost disadvantage in its export markets and will sell less than an indigenous
rival.
Suppose that m firms are located in country a and the remaining (k−m) firms produce
in country b. Maximising (5) taking into account demand (4), yields firm output levels:
xaa =
n [α− w + (k −m) τ ]
β (k + 1)
; xba =
(1− n)[α− w − (1 + k −m) τ ]
β (k + 1)
;
xab =
n [α− w − (1 +m) τ ]
β (k + 1)
; xbb =
(1− n)[α− w +mτ ]
β (k + 1)
.
(6)
Note that xab/xaa, xba/xbb < 1, confirming our assertion that a foreign firm’s share of a
market is always less than that of a local firm whenever there are trade costs (τ > 0).9
The corresponding equilibrium market outputs and prices are:
Xa =
n [k(α− w)− (k −m) τ ]
β (k + 1)
; Xb =
(1− n)[k(α− w)−mτ ]
β (k + 1)
;
pa =
α + kw + (k −m) τ
k + 1
; pb =
α + kw +mτ
k + 1
.
(7)
Notice that consumer prices in both countries fall when the total number of firms k
increases and competition in the oligopolistic industry is thereby intensified. Moreover,
for any given level of k, increasing m (the number of firms that locate in country a)
reduces the consumer price of good x in that country, but increases the price in coun-
try b. That is, whatever the size of the industry, having more firms producing locally
intensifies domestic competition and drives down consumer prices.
Substituting (6) and (7) into (5) yields the pre-tax profits of firms located in each
country:
pia =
n [α− w + (k −m) τ ]2
β (k + 1)2
+
(1− n) [α− w − (1 + k −m) τ ]2
β (k + 1)2
;
pib =
n [α− w − (1 +m) τ ]2
β (k + 1)2
+
(1− n)[α− w +mτ ]2
β (k + 1)2
.
(8)
9As our model allows for differences in country size, this is not inconsistent with the possibility
that a firm may sell more in its export market than at home.
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We assume that profits are taxed at source by the host countries of the firms.10 Let ti
be the lump-sum tax imposed on each firm by country i. Thus total tax revenues are
Ta = tam for country a and
Tb = tb (k −m) for country b.
(9)
The tax differential between countries is ∆ ≡ ta− tb. In deciding upon where to invest,
firms will compare profits net of taxes and locate in the more profitable country. The
locational equilibrium for the industry will be characterised by pia − ta = pib − tb.
Substituting (8) gives the equilibrium number of firms choosing to locate in country a:
m =
k
2
+
(2n− 1) [2 (α− w)− τ ]
2τ
− ∆β (k + 1)
2τ 2
. (10)
Suppose, initially, that each country charges the same tax, that is ∆ = 0. If the countries
were the same size (n = 0.5), it is clear from (10) thatm = k/2, that is, the firms would
be evenly split between the two locations. In the absence of trade costs, neither country
has a locational advantage and m is undefined. When trade is costly and country a is
relatively large (n > 0.5), it attracts more than half of the firms. Differences in taxes
will further affect the location of firms such that, if country a taxes firms more heavily
than country b (that is, ∆ > 0), a’s share of the firms will be relatively smaller than it
would otherwise be.
How is the international distribution of firms affected by changes in relative country
size, trade costs, and tax differences? Partial differentiation of (10) yields:
dm
dn
=
2 (α− w)− τ
τ
> 0;
dm
dτ
=
− (2n− 1) (α− w)
τ 2
+
∆β (k + 1)
τ 3
≶ 0;
dm
d∆
=
dm
dta
=
−β (k + 1)
2τ 2
= −dm
dtb
< 0.
(11)
We see from (11) that, as the asymmetry in country size (n) increases, country a
attracts a greater share of the firms while the effect of rising trade costs on firm location
10There is a general agreement in the literature that international company taxation closely follows
the source principle. This principle applies directly, if countries avoid international double taxation
by exempting foreign-earned income from domestic tax. If countries grant an international tax credit
instead, source taxation is still effective in many cases, because crediting applies only after profits
have been repatriated and because countries do not rebate ‘excess’ taxes paid abroad.
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is ambiguous. Whenever a is larger than b (i.e., that is n > 0.5) the direct (first) effect
of a rise in trade costs is to increase the international dispersion of firms, moving more
firms to the smaller country. However, higher trade costs also imply that the impact of
a given international tax differential becomes less important. If the large country levies
the higher tax (∆ > 0), this isolated (second) effect works in the direction of increasing
the number of firms in country a. Hence the net effect of changes in trade costs on the
concentration of industry will only be determined once tax rates are endogenised in
section 3.2. Lastly, increasing a country’s tax clearly creates a disincentive for firms to
locate there.
2.3 Governments
The governments of countries a and b each impose lump-sum taxes on firms that locate
within their respective jurisdictions. Importantly, these taxes can be negative, acting
as subsidies to attract investment to a particular country. If revenues from the business
tax are positive, then these are redistributed equally and in a lump-sum way to the
residents in the country in which they are collected. The costs of a negative business
tax are raised through lump-sum taxation of consumers. Recall that, despite their
lump-sum character, business taxes still distort the location decision of internationally
mobile firms [eq. (10)].11
In addition to tax revenue, governments care about the consumer surplus of households
in their jurisdictions. Substituting the equilibrium market prices for good x [see (7)]
into the linear market demand curves (4), total consumer surplus, denoted Si, in each
of the two countries is given by
Sa =
n [k(α− w)− (k −m)τ ]2
2β(k + 1)2
, Sb =
(1− n) [k(α− w)−mτ ]2
2β(k + 1)2
. (12)
It is straightforward to show that consumer surplus in both countries is rising in the
total number of firms k, as this intensifies competition and reduces producer prices in
both countries [cf. eq. (7)]. Moreover, a rise inm, the share of firms located in country a,
11Introducing an ad valorem profit tax instead of a unit lump-sum tax on firms would complicate the
algebra, but it would cause no further distortions and hence would not change any of our qualitative
results. The assumption that lump-sum taxes are available to cover the costs of subsidies to firms will
be relaxed in section 5.
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raises consumer surplus in that country, but lowers it in country b, because, as we have
already established, consumer prices are lower when more firms produce locally. This
gives each nation an incentive to attract firms to its home jurisdiction.12
We initially assume that firms’ profits accrue to the residents of a third country (but
recall footnote 4). The objective of each government is then simply to maximise the
sum of consumer surplus and tax revenue collected from locally producing firms. Con-
sequently, the objective functions of the two governments are
Wa = Sa + Ta, Wb = Sb + Tb. (13)
We substitute (9) and (12) in (13) and differentiate each country’s welfare expression
with respect to its own tax, using the derivative properties of m in (11). This gives the
following first-order conditions for each country’s tax rate:
ta =
τ{τm[2(k + 1)− n]− nk(α− w − τ)}
(k + 1)2β
;
tb =
τ{τ(k −m)[2(k + 1)− (1− n)]− k(α− w − τ)}
(k + 1)2β
.
(14)
These expressions still include m, which is endogenous. To arrive at reduced-form
expressions for the Nash equilibrium tax rates, eq. (10) must be substituted into the
set of first-order conditions (14). To develop an intuition for our results we will first
perform this analysis in the benchmark case of symmetric countries. In a second step,
we progress to the more general case where countries differ in size.
3 Equilibrium taxes and location
3.1 Benchmark: Symmetric countries
To analyse the benchmark case where countries are identical in all respects, we evaluate
the first-order conditions for the two countries’ optimal tax rates (14) at n = 0.5 and
12Clearly, savings in transportation cost are only one (analytically convenient) example of why
governments may want to attract internationally mobile firms. This motive could, for example, be
replaced by technological linkages that exist between the oligopolistic industry x and the production
of the numeraire good z. Such a setting would yield similar qualitative conclusions, but would involve
a more complex analysis.
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substitute the equilibrium allocation of firms (10), again using this restriction. This
yields best-response functions where each country’s tax is a function of the tax set by
the other nation’s government:
ti (tj) =
kτ{4τ(k + 1)− [2(α− w)− τ ]}
(k + 1)β[8(k + 1)− 1] + tj
[4(k + 1)− 1]
[8(k + 1)− 1] , i, j ∈ {a, b}, i 6= j. (15)
These symmetric, best-response functions have positive slopes, implying that an in-
crease in one country’s business tax rate will raise that of the other country.
Solving the pair of simultaneous equations yields closed-form solutions for the common
Nash equilibrium tax rate:
ts =
kτ
(k + 1)β
[
τ − 2(α− w)− τ
4(k + 1)
]
, (16)
where the superscript s stands for the symmetric case. These equilibrium tax rates (16)
reflect two fundamental effects that are at work in the present model.
The positive first term in the square brackets arises from a competition effect. Intu-
itively, starting from a symmetric equilibrium and moving one firm from country b to
country a implies that each firm in country a now faces more intense competition in its
home market. Since a firm’s home market is relatively more profitable than its export
market, the gross profits of each firm in country a fall, whereas the gross profits of each
firm that remains in country b rise. This profit differential implies that a location rent
arises for each firm even in a fully symmetric equilibrium, in the sense that the next
best alternative (i.e., relocation to the other country) involves lower gross profits. This
location rent can be taxed by the host government without causing a firm to move
to the other jurisdiction.13 This competition effect becomes stronger with higher trade
costs, as these increase the difference in profitability between the home and the foreign
markets.
In contrast, the second term in the square brackets of (16) is the source of a negative,
consumer-price effect. When an additional firm enters a country, consumer prices fall
and, as discussed above, this provides each country with an incentive to offer location
subsidies to firms.
13Algebraically, this effect can be shown by differentiating the gross profits that each firm earns in
a symmetric equilibrium [eq. (8)] with respect to m. The resulting profit differential between a firm
that is located in country b and one that is located in a is just equal to the first term in (16).
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From (16) we can determine the critical level of trade costs τ ∗ at which the two effects
just offset one another such that equilibrium taxes are zero:
τ ∗ =
2(α− w)
4(k + 1) + 1
. (17)
For trade costs τ > τ ∗ the competition effect dominates and equilibrium tax rates
are positive, whereas for τ < τ ∗ the consumer price effect is relatively stronger and
equilibrium taxes are negative (that is, subsidies are given). Finally, neither effect
has any impact in the absence of trade costs (τ = 0). In this free-trade case, the
Nash equilibrium taxes are zero as both governments and firms are indifferent to the
equilibrium pattern of firm location.14
It should be noted that governments are constrained in their ability to tax, as post-
tax profits must remain non-negative for all k firms. Otherwise some of the firms
would choose not to produce. To derive this constraint, we subtract the tax rate in the
symmetric Nash equilibrium (16) from a firm’s pre-tax profits (8). Setting the difference
equal to zero yields a critical value of trade costs τ¯ where:
τ¯ =
(α− w) [k − 2 +√13k2 + 8k − 4]
(3k2 + 3k − 2) . (18)
Equation (18) defines a negative relationship between the total number of firms in the
market and the critical (maximum) level of trade costs τ¯ . Only if τ ≤ τ¯ , will all k firms
be prepared to enter and produce in the region. For any given level of (α− w), a high
k reduces the gross profits that can be earned by each firm in equilibrium. In contrast,
a high level of τ increases the ability of a country to set higher taxes when these taxes
are positive in the initial equilibrium.15
We can also derive a condition under which positive levels of trade will occur in equi-
librium. In the symmetry of the benchmark case, this condition is the same for firms
located in either country. From (8) and using m = k/2, we find that exporting to
14This special case is related to the analysis by Janeba (1998), who introduces firm mobility to the
standard model of strategic tax policy but does not include transport costs. He shows that equilibrium
trade taxes will then be zero in both countries, in contrast to the trade subsidies that result in the
absence of firm mobility (and with Cournot competition of firms).
15It is easily checked that the critical level of τ at which equilibrium tax rates turn positive [eq. (17)]
is below τ¯ and hence there is indeed a range of transport costs for which positive equilibrium taxes
result. This is, of course, a consequence of firms earning positive gross profits in our model.
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the other market is profitable as long as trade costs are less than prohibitive, that is,
τ < τP , where the prohibitive trade cost is
τP =
2(α− w)
2 + k
. (19)
If τ > τP , there will be no trade. Consequently, there will be k/2 firms selling in each
autarkic market in equilibrium. Comparing the critical values in (18) and (19) shows
that τ¯ ≤ τP for all k ≥ 2. Hence eq. (18) is the binding constraint in our model. When
this constraint is met and all k firms make non-negative after-tax profits, then there
will also be international trade in equilibrium.
How are the symmetric Nash equilibrium tax rates affected by changes in the exogenous
parameters of the model? Consider first an increase in the total number of mobile firms
in the economy. Differentiating (16) with respect to k yields
∂ts
∂k
=
τ{4τ(k + 1) + (k − 1)[2(α− w)− τ ]}
4(k + 1)3β
> 0. (20)
An increase in k unambiguously raises equilibrium tax rates. Intuitively, a rise in the
total number of firms lowers the costs that are perceived by each country from losing
one of the firms to the other country. The decline in the consumer-price effect reduces
the willingness of each country to grant location subsidies. Moreover the larger number
of firms strengthens the positive competition effect. This aspect can be explained as
follows. The stronger is competition, and hence the closer prices are to marginal costs,
the more severe is the disadvantage from having to bear extra trade costs. This is seen
from the model property that the market share of foreign firms falls when the total
number of firms is increased [cf. eq. (6)]. Hence, starting from a symmetric equilibrium,
the penalty rises for a firm that attempts to escape high domestic taxes by moving
abroad, and this strengthens the ability of each country to tax location rents.16
Increasing the market size of both countries (a rise in α) has the opposite implications.
In this case it is directly inferred from (16) that ∂ts/∂α < 0. With higher sales per
firm, each country has more to gain from attracting an additional firm so that the
16This effect underlies the different results in models where two countries compete for a single
monopolist and pay subsidies in equilibrium, and those where they compete for two mobile firms and
are able to levy positive taxes (see Ferrett and Wooton, 2005). Our analysis show that this effect holds
more generally, and also applies to continuous increases in the number of firms.
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Figure 1: Nash equilibrium tax rates in the symmetric equilibrium
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consumer-price effect becomes larger. On the other hand, the competition effect is not
affected by an increase in the size of both markets. Hence each country will find it
optimal to lower its profit tax, even though sales and gross profits per firm rise. This
shows very clearly that there is no link in our model between equilibrium tax rates
and the gross profits earned by each firm. What matters instead is only the countries’
bargaining position vis-a`-vis each mobile firm.
Finally, we turn to changes in trade costs. Differentiating (16) with respect to τ gives
∂ts
∂τ
=
k[4τ(k + 1)− (α− w − τ)]
2(k + 1)2β
,
which may be positive or negative. However, we can determine a critical threshold
value for τ , for which this derivative is zero. This is
τ ∗∗ =
α− w
4(k + 1) + 1
. (21)
For τ > τ ∗∗, the tax rate is rising in trade costs, whereas for τ < τ ∗∗ it is falling in τ .
Moreover, comparing (21) with (17) shows that τ ∗∗ < τ ∗/2.
The relationship between the level of trade costs and the equilibrium tax rates in the
symmetric Nash equilibrium is then as shown in Figure 1. This figure shows that,
starting from high levels of trade costs (τ > τ ∗), a fall in these costs (commonly
interpreted as economic integration) will reduce the ability of symmetric countries
15
to raise positive business taxes. Below τ ∗ taxes turn negative and continue to fall
until they reach a minimum (i.e., a maximum subsidy) at τ ∗∗. To explain this negative
relationship for relatively high levels of trade costs, note that the competition effect and
the consumer price effect are both weakened when trade costs are reduced. However,
the ability of countries to extract location rents falls more quickly as long as τ > τ ∗∗.
If trade costs fall still further (τ < τ ∗∗), the relative strength of the competition and
consumer price effects is reversed and tax rates rise again until they reach zero at τ = 0.
Our results are summarised in
Proposition 1 If both countries are identical, symmetric equilibrium tax rates are
falling in market size and rising in the number of mobile firms. As economic integration
proceeds (trade costs fall), equilibrium tax rates first fall and then rise again. There is a
critical value of trade costs τ ∗, where equilibrium taxes switch from positive to negative
(i.e., to subsidies).
3.2 Differences in country size
Having discussed the basic working of our model in the special case of symmetry, we now
turn to the more general case where countries differ in size. Substituting m from (10)
into (14) we obtain closed-form solutions for the asymmetric Nash equilibrium tax
rates:
t∗a =
kτ
β(k + 1)
[
τ − nµ
2(k + 1)
]
+
τµ(2n− 1)(3k + 2)[2(k + 1)− n]
2β(k + 1)2[6(k + 1)− 1] ,
t∗b =
kτ
β(k + 1)
[
τ − nµ
2(k + 1)
]
− τµ(2n− 1)[2(k + 1) + n(3k + 2)]
2β(k + 1)2[6(k + 1)− 1] ,
(22)
where µ ≡ [2(α− w)− τ ] > 0. The derivations of (22) are relegated to the appendix.
The first term in (22) is identical for both countries and captures the counteracting
competition and consumer-price effects that have been discussed above.17 The second
terms in (22) show how the overall bargaining position of countries vis-a`-vis individual
firms is modified by an additional home-market effect. Each firm will save aggregate
trade costs and thereby make higher gross profits when it locates in the larger coun-
try. This allows the larger country a to impose a higher tax than in the symmetric
17It is easily checked that the first terms in (22) reduce to eq. (16) for the symmetric case n = 0.5.
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equilibrium, whereas the smaller country b has to compensate firms for its location dis-
advantage by offering a lower tax (or a higher subsidy). The equilibrium tax differential
is given by
∆∗ ≡ t∗a − t∗b =
3τ(2n− 1)[2(α− w)− τ ]
β[6(k + 1)− 1] > 0. (23)
This differential increases as the disparity in country size n becomes greater and as the
size of the market α expands, but it falls as the total number of firms in the industry
k increases.
The home-market effect is strengthened by high trade costs, as is seen from differenti-
ating (23) with respect to τ :
∂∆∗
∂τ
=
6(2n− 1)(α− w − τ)
β[6(k + 1)− 1] > 0. (24)
This derivative is unambiguously positive when international trade occurs [cf. (19)].
Economic integration, in the form of a decline in trade costs, will reduce the absolute
tax differential between the large and the small country.
Looking more closely at the effects of changes in trade costs, differentiating the tax
levels in each country [eq. (22)] and re-substituting their values in the initial equilibrium
yields:
∂t∗i
∂τ
=
2 [(α− w − τ)t∗i + (α− w)]
τ [2(α− w)− τ ] ∀ i ∈ {a, b}. (25)
Hence, for either of the two countries, a positive tax rate in the initial equilibrium is
sufficient (but not necessary) to ensure that a fall in trade costs reduces the optimal tax
rate. This result parallels that for symmetric countries. However, from (22), the critical
level of trade costs at which the large country’s tax rate turns positive is now reduced,
relative to the symmetric case, whereas the critical level of trade costs at which the
small country is able to levy positive taxes is increased.
Next we turn to the equilibrium pattern of firm location. This is determined by sub-
stituting the optimal tax rates in (22) into equation (10), yielding
m =
k
2
+
(2n− 1) [2 (α− w)− τ ]
2τ
[3(k + 1)− 1]
[6(k + 1)− 1] . (26)
Equation (26) implies that a threshold level of trade costs, denoted τ , must be exceeded
in order to meet the restriction that the number of firms in the small country b is
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positive (m < k). This lower bound for τ in the presence of size asymmetries is given
by
τ =
2(α− w)(2n− 1)[3(k + 1)− 1]
k[6(k + 1)− 1] + (2n− 1)[3(k + 1)− 1] .
The lower bound τ is zero in the case of symmetric countries and it rises as the size
differential between countries a and b increases. In other words, if low levels of trade
costs (and thus a high degree of economic integration) are to be considered in our
model, then the size asymmetries between the two countries must not be “too large”.
The relationship between trade costs and equilibrium tax rates in each of the two
countries is then as shown in Figure 2.18
We have already established that the number of firms that locates in the larger of the
two countries (country a) is rising in the size difference n. However, the effects of trade
costs on the equilibrium location of firms are ambiguous, in general, when the level of
tax rates is exogenous [see (11)]. We can now evaluate the comparative static effect of
a change in τ at the asymmetric tax equilibrium. Differentiating (26) with respect to
18To simplify the graph, Figure 2 ignores the fact that the maximum levels of trade costs that
are compatible with non-negative profits (τ¯) will generally differ for the two countries. The country-
specific levels of τ¯ are computed by substituting (26) in (8) and setting the resulting gross profit levels
equal to the lump-sum taxes (22).
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τ , and noting that (1− 2n) < 0, yields:
∂m
∂τ
=
(1− 2n) [3(k + 1)− 1]
2τ [6(k + 1)− 1]
{
1 +
[2(α− w)− τ ]
τ
}
< 0. (27)
Hence a fall in trade costs will unambiguously increase the number of firms in the
larger country a. The dominant effect is that trade costs shield the firms that locate
in one market from the competition of firms that have located in the other. As trade
costs fall, the competitive pressure rises relatively more in the small country b, because
a larger number of firms (those located in a) become closer competitors. Hence mar-
ket integration makes it less attractive to locate in the small country, resulting in an
increase in the concentration of production activity. These results are summarised in
Proposition 2 When countries differ only in size, the country with the larger home
market imposes the higher tax rate. A fall in trade costs lowers the equilibrium tax
differential and increases the concentration of firms in the larger country.
4 Economic integration and national welfare
We now turn to the welfare effects of economic integration and start again with the
benchmark case of symmetric countries. Substituting (12) and (16) in (13) and setting
m = k/2 yields the maximised welfare for each country
W s =
k2
16β(k + 1)2
{
[2(α− w)− τ ]2 + 2τ 2[4(k + 1) + 1]− 4τ(α− w)} . (28)
Differentiating with respect to τ yields
∂W s
∂τ
=
k2
16β(k + 1)2
{[8(k + 1) + 3]τ − 4(α− w)} . (29)
For high levels of trade costs, economic integration (a fall in τ) is welfare-reducing
for both countries while for low trade costs, a further reduction is instead welfare-
increasing. The critical value of trade costs, where welfare reaches a minimum is ob-
tained by setting ∂W s/∂τ in (29) equal to zero. This critical value τ˜ is:
τ˜ =
4(α− w)
[8(k + 1) + 3]
. (30)
This U -shaped relationship between national welfare and trade costs closely mirrors the
relationship between equilibrium tax rates and trade costs. At high levels of trade costs,
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a reduction in these costs weakens the competition effect, reducing the tax power of
governments in the symmetric equilibrium, and lowering both tax revenue and welfare.
At low levels of τ , a further fall in trade costs reduces the gains for each country from
granting location subsidies to firms. This alleviates subsidy competition and increases
each country’s welfare. Comparing the critical level τ˜ to the level of trade costs that
induces the minimum tax τ ∗∗ [see eq. (21)], shows that τ˜ > τ ∗∗. Thus, as trade costs
fall below τ˜ , tax rates continue to decline for some range of trade costs to the left of
τ˜ while welfare starts to climb again. The increase in welfare is explained by the fact
that the falling tax revenues (alternatively, the increasing subsidy payments) are more
than compensated by the rise in consumer surplus associated with the reduction in
trade costs.
To analyse the effects on national welfare when countries differ in size, we substi-
tute (10), (12) and (22) in (13). At low levels of economic integration equilibrium taxes
are positive in both countries and a reduction in τ will cause taxes and welfare to
fall. However the welfare-minimizing levels of τ will differ for the large and the small
country. Given that welfare in each country is a non-monotonic function of trade costs,
there is the possibility that economic integration will have the opposite welfare effect
in each country over a certain range of τ . In particular, it can be shown that this is the
case when the trade cost is equal to τ˜ , as defined in (30). At this level of trade costs
(and, from continuity, in the neighbourhood of this value), the following holds:
∂Wa
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
τ˜
> 0,
∂Wb
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
τ˜
< 0. (31)
This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3 There is a range of trade costs for which economic integration (a fall
in τ) reduces welfare in the larger country but increases welfare in the smaller country.
Proof: See the appendix.
Proposition 3 is explained from the fact that both the competition effect and the
consumer-price effect are weaker for the small country. The smaller country is the less
attractive location from the perspective of firms, but it also has fewer consumers and
therefore has a smaller incentive to grant location subsidies. For this reason, the b’s
welfare level Wb reaches its minimum at a higher level of trade costs as compared to
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Figure 3: Welfare effects of economic integration
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Wa. Figure 3 illustrates these results. In the graph, economic integration has opposing
welfare effects on the two countries if trade costs are in the range τa < τ < τb, where
τi is the turning point of Wi with respect to τ .
Finally, we illustrate the results of our basic model by means of a simulation analysis.
The results are summarised in Table 3. The table shows that country b’s tax rate turns
negative at a higher level of trade costs, τ ∗b ≈ 0.27 than that of country a, which turns
negative at τ ∗a ≈ 0.17. Consequently, for values of τ in the interval (0.17, 0.27), a fall in
trade costs lowers welfare in country a, but raises welfare in country b. In this particular
numerical example, the upper limit of trade costs that still ensures non-negative after-
tax profits is τ¯ ≈ 0.68. At this level of trade costs, the tax rates as a percentage of
gross profits (given in the last two columns of the table) approach unity for both the
large and the small country. On the other hand, the lower limit for τ that ensures a
non-negative number of firms in the smaller country is τ ≈ 0.10.
We can compare these numerical results of our model with the empirical evidence on
the development of statutory and effective average tax rates, as given in Table 1.19
19The effective average tax rate (EATR) is computed as a weighted average of the statutory tax
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Table 3: Simulation results for the basic model
τ ta tb Wa Wb m pi
a pib ta/pia tb/pib
0.680 0.318 0.260 12.162 11.608 5.675 0.319 0.261 0.998 0.998
0.550 0.191 0.143 11.237 10.534 5.846 0.279 0.231 0.687 0.622
0.450 0.115 0.075 10.766 9.982 6.045 0.253 0.214 0.454 0.352
0.350 0.057 0.026 10.415 9.667 6.357 0.233 0.202 0.245 0.128
0.250 0.018 -0.005 10.218 9.590 6.920 0.217 0.195 0.081 -0.025
0.200 0.005 -0.013 10.178 9.641 7.412 0.212 0.193 0.023 -0.069
0.150 -0.003 -0.017 10.176 9.752 8.233 0.207 0.193 -0.016 -0.088
0.100 -0.007 -0.016 10.213 9.922 9.874 0.204 0.194 -0.034 -0.082
numerical specification: k=10, α− w=5, n=0.6, β=1
By both measures, corporate taxation has declined since 1985 in both large and small
countries. This is consistent with the results of our model in the earlier phases of
economic integration. Moreover, at each point in time, the average tax rate levied by
large countries is higher than that of small countries, as stated in our Proposition 2.
Finally, a closer look at the time pattern of tax adjustments shows that in 1985, at the
onset of economic integration, tax rates were at a “maximum” level that was similar
for large and small countries. In the early phases of economic integration, tax rates
fell more in the small countries, leading to a substantial tax gap between large and
small countries by 1995. As economic integration continued, the large countries also
cut their tax rates and the tax gap between large and small countries narrowed during
the period 1995-2005. The last two columns of Table 3 show that the initial widening
and later narrowing of this tax gap is compatible with the results of our model, if the
lump-sum taxes on each firm (which have been used for tractability reasons in our
theoretical analysis) are transformed into ad valorem profit taxes.
rate and the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR). In contrast to the EMTR, which measures the tax
burden on a marginal investment project that just earns a competitive rate of return, the EATR also
includes the taxation of pure economic profit. This makes it the most relevant measure for analysing
the discrete location choices of profit-making firms. See Devereux et al. (2002) for more details.
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5 Domestic profit income and distortionary taxes
We now consider two extensions to the model. First, we change the ownership structure
of firms by letting all (after-tax) profit income accrue to the residents of the host
countries. Additionally, we force governments to use distortionary taxes in order to
finance subsidies to firms. As both of these extensions increase the complexity of the
algebra, we restrict the analysis to our benchmark case of symmetric countries.
In this setting, the residents of each country own k/2 firms and receive the resulting
profit income after taxes. Since after-tax profits are equalised by mobile firms, the
location of firms does not matter for the distribution of profits. Total after-tax profit
income in country i is
Πi =
k
2
(pia − ta) = k
2
(pib − tb), (32)
where pia and pib are given in (8). These profit incomes expand the individual budget
constraints in (2) but, due to the quasi-linear specification of utility, do not change the
individual and market demands for good x [eqs. (3)–(4)].
We weight tax revenue in each country by an exogenous factor λ ≥ 1. This captures
the fact that governments typically do not have access to lump-sum taxes in order to
pay subsidies to firms, but must resort to distortionary taxes on personal income or
commodity purchases. Hence (λ − 1) represents the excess burden of this alternative
tax instrument. In the opposite case where equilibrium taxes on firms are positive,
distortionary taxes can be reduced and the value of one unit of profit-tax revenue is
once again given by λ.20
With these specifications, national welfare in countries a and b is given by
Wa = Sa +Πa + λTa, Wb = Sb +Πb + λTb. (33)
Substituting (10), (12) and (32) into (33) and evaluating all terms under symmetry
(n = 0.5) gives the following equilibrium tax rate, which is derived in the appendix:
t˜ =
kτ
(k + 1)βλ
[
τ
(
λ− 1
2
)
− 2(α− w)− τ
4(k + 1)
]
. (34)
The structure of the expression in equation (34) is very similar to that in the benchmark
analysis [eq.(16)]. The two main differences reflecting the changes in assumptions are
20See e.g. Keen and Lahiri (1998) for a similar procedure.
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both incorporated in the first term in the square bracket (the competition effect). On
the one hand, the benefits from taxing profit income are now reduced because, in the
symmetric equilibrium, one half of the incidence of the tax falls on domestic capital
owners. On the other hand, the gains from taxation are increased, because each unit
of tax revenue now receives a value above one in the national welfare function. If the
excess burden is sufficiently high (λ > 1.5) the latter effect dominates and the critical
value of τ ∗ in Figure 1 moves to the left. In the reverse case where τ < 1.5, positive tax
rates will now be levied only for a smaller range of high trade costs. In any event, the
positive competition effect will still be present in this extended model, because each
country’s profit tax will partly fall on foreign capital owners.
6 Discussion
The model presented above combines two strands of research; linking tax/subsidy com-
petition for a small number of firms (monopoly or duopoly) with new economic geog-
raphy focusing on patterns of agglomeration in multi-firm settings. In the following we
relate our results to each of these literatures, starting with the former.
Note first that the use of calculus in the present paper carries the implicit assump-
tion that the number of firms changes continuously in response to tax changes. This is
clearly inappropriate when the number of firms is small and the relocation of a single
firm involves a discrete change in the location equilibrium. This is most obvious with
a monopoly (k = 1). In that case, the equilibrium tax formula in eq. (16) exhibits a
competition effect, as the analysis implicitly assumes that this firm is divisible. How-
ever, in the “true” model such a single, indivisible firm will not face any competition if
it relocates to the other country. Hence models of competition for a monopoly firm do
not have a competition effect. This explains why such models typically feature negative
tax rates in equilibrium (see, e.g., Haaparanta, 1996; Fumagalli, 2003; Davies, 2005).
The competition effect first arises with two firms; either when there is a pre-existing firm
in one of the two countries (Bjorvatn and Eckel, 2006) or when the countries compete
for two mobile firms (Ferrett and Wooton, 2005). These results are generalised in our
setting where the equilibrium tax rate is a rising function of the number of mobile firms
k [see eq. (20) and Proposition 1]. Moreover, as in Ferrett and Wooton (2005), it is
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possible in our analysis that all gross profits can be extracted by the host countries,
even if they set tax rates non-cooperatively. This is the case whenever the constraint
on net profits [eq. (18)] is binding, which will be more likely the larger the number of
mobile firms.
In contrast to the models of tax competition under monopolistic or duopolistic market
structures, our analysis derives equilibrium tax rates as a continuous function of exoge-
nous model parameters. This allows us to also compare our results to those found in the
new economic geography literature. These latter models generally distinguish between
two qualitatively different regimes. If all firms are concentrated in one country they
earn agglomeration rents that can be fully taxed away by the country that hosts this
core (Baldwin and Krugman, 2004). If instead firms are regionally dispersed in the loca-
tional equilibrium, then the corresponding equilibrium tax rates in both countries will
be negative (Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 2005).21 In the present model, in contrast,
location rents can arise and tax rates can be positive, even if the equilibrium features
a completely symmetric distribution of firms. The core difference is that the number of
firms is exogenously fixed in our analysis and firms make positive profits in equilibrium.
In contrast the new economic geography models typically assume endogenous market
entry, which drives each firm’s profit to zero. In that case, no taxable location rent can
arise in either country, and the competition effect accordingly disappears.22
The competition effect is also crucial in explaining contrasting conclusions with respect
to the effects of economic integration. In the full agglomeration case of Baldwin and
Krugman (2004), the taxable agglomeration rent earned by firms in the core country is
concave (bell-shaped) in the level of trade costs. This implies that economic integration
may lead to rising tax rates in the core countries before tax rates eventually fall.
In contrast, tax rates are a convex function of trade costs in the present model and
economic integration leads to falling tax rates throughout the range where the taxes
21See their Proposition 3. Note that there is an error in part (i) of this proposition. In the case
where countries are equal-sized, equilibrium tax rates will be negative (and not zero) in both countries.
Together with their Proposition 3 (ii) this implies that taxes will be negative in any interior locational
equilibrium with a positive number of firms in each country. We thank Tanguy van Ypersele for
clarifying discussions on this issue.
22Effectively profits are turned into capital income in the new economic geography models. These
capital incomes, however, are not affected by the lump-sum tax on firms.
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are positive. The difference is most obvious at the maximum level of trade costs. In the
economic geography setting, this upper bound represents a no-trade condition where
no location rents arise and equilibrium tax rates are zero. Hence agglomeration rents
and positive tax rates can only arise for trade costs below this critical threshold. In the
present model, in contrast, the upper bound on trade costs represents a non-negativity
condition for net profits [eq. (18)]. Hence tax rates are at a maximum at this level of
trade costs.
We have already discussed the empirical evidence collected in Table 1. This shows that,
in the two decades since 1985, economic integration has led to a reduction in statutory
and effective corporate tax rates in small and large countries alike. This finding is
consistent with the results of our model but it contradicts the theoretical prediction
that the economic geography models of tax competition derive for the large (“core”)
countries in the agglomerated equilibrium.
Finally we briefly compare our results to those derived in models of asymmetric tax
competition when capital markets are perfectly competitive (Bucovetsky, 1991; Wilson,
1991). A result that holds for both competitive and imperfectly competitive capital
markets is that small countries levy lower tax rates. This result is also in line with
the empirical evidence (see Table 1). There are important differences, however. Firstly,
with competitive markets the equilibrium location of capital depends only on tax rates,
with the smaller country attracting a more than proportionate share of capital due to it
underbidding its larger neighbour. In contrast, the location pattern for mobile firms is
much richer in the present model and depends on market size and competition effects, in
addition to tax differences. Secondly, neither the competition effect nor the consumer-
price effect is present in a model with perfectly competitive capital markets. Hence
capital tax rates will be zero in such a model when lump-sum taxes are simultaneously
available.23 This implies in particular that a switch from positive to negative tax rates,
which is a characteristic result of our model (see Proposition 1), cannot arise in a
setting with perfectly competitive capital markets.
23In the models of Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991) positive tax rates are instead enforced by
the assumption that source-based capital taxes are the only tax instrument to finance a public good.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper we have set up a simple model where two countries of different size
compete for the location of an exogenously determined, but variable, number of profit-
making firms in an oligopolistic industry. This model has allowed us to derive closed-
form solutions both for the equilibrium allocation of firms and for the tax rates charged
by each country. A special feature of the model is that taxable location rents can
arise even in an interior location equilibrium where firms are dispersed. At the same
time national governments have the incentive to attract internationally mobile firms
by means of subsidies, in order to save on trade costs. Whether taxes are positive or
negative in the location equilibrium depends on the interplay of these two counteracting
forces.
Our analysis has led to two main results. First, economic integration leads to a U -
shaped relationship between the degree of economic integration and the level of equi-
librium taxes in both the large and the small country. In this process there is a critical
level of trade costs where tax rates switch from positive to negative. This result may be
indicative of the actual policy experience where a combination of falling statutory and
effective corporate taxes, the proliferation of preferential tax regimes for internation-
ally mobile firms, and the increasingly widespread use of investment subsidies have, in
sum, led to net effective tax payments of mobile firms that are close to zero or even
negative. Also most observers seem to expect that this trend will continue as global
economic integration proceeds further, despite some attempts at policy coordination
among the EU and OECD member states.
A second main result of our model is that economic integration can simultaneously
benefit small countries and harm large countries. This result may be relevant for several
of the recent policy debates in the area of international tax coordination, such as the
EU’s interest withholding tax directive or the elimination of “harmful tax practices”,
pursued simultaneously by the European Union (Primarolo Report, 1999) and the
OECD (2000). To a large extent, these policy initiatives are targeted against small tax
havens. This demonstrates that there are conflicting interests between large countries,
which favour coordination measures to cushion the effects of economic integration, and
the small countries that do not.
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Appendix
Derivation of equation set (22)
Substituting m from (10) into (14) and rearranging gives each country’s best response
function
ta =
2τ 2k
β [4(k + 1)− n] +
τµ{(2n− 1)[2(k + 1)− n]− nk}
β(k + 1)[4(k + 1)− n] + tb
[2(k + 1)− n]
[4(k + 1)− n] ,
tb =
2τ 2k
β [4(k + 1)− u] −
τµ{(2n− 1)[2(k + 1)− u] + uk}
β(k + 1)[4(k + 1)− u] + ta
[2(k + 1)− u]
[4(k + 1)− u]
(A.1)
where µ ≡ [2(α − w) − τ ] > 0 and u ≡ (1 − n). Solving the set of simultaneous
equations (A.1) yields the reduced-form expressions for the Nash equilibrium taxes in
the asymmetric equilibrium, given in (22).
Proof of Proposition 3
Substituting (22) and (26) in country a’s welfare function [eq. (13)] and differentiating
with respect to τ gives
∂Wa
∂τ
=
∂Sa
∂τ
+ ta
∂m
∂τ
+m
∂ta
∂τ
.
Performing the derivations gives, in a first step
∂Wa
∂τ
=
τ [2mk(k + 1) + nk2 − nm(k −m)]− nk2(α− w)
β(k + 1)2
−ta(2n− 1)(3k + 2)(α− w)
τ 2(6k + 5)
+
(2n− 1)(3k + 2)[2k + 2− n]m(α− w − τ)
β(k + 1)2(6k + 5)
. (A.2)
It is easily checked that this expression reduces to (29) when countries are symmetric
(n = 0.5 and hence m = k/2).
Evaluating (A.2) at τ˜ , as given in (30), yields
∂Wa
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
τ˜
=
(α− w)(2n− 1)Ωa
β(k + 1)2(6k + 5)
where
Ωa ≡ 2k(k + 1)(12k
2 + 33k + 18)
8k + 11
+
k(3k + 2)[n+ (k + 1)(4n− 1)]
2
+
(2n− 1)(8k + 9)2
4(8k + 11)(6k + 5)
+
(3k + 2)[2(k + 1)− n][k(48k2 + 82k + 35)− (2n− 1)(48k2 + 86k + 36)]
2(6k + 5)(8k + 11)
.
Since Ωa > 0 for all k > 1 and n > 0.5 by assumption, it follows that ∂Wa/∂τ |τ˜ > 0.
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For country b we proceed analogously. Using (22) and (26) in Wb [eq. (13)] and differ-
entiating with respect to τ gives
∂Wb
∂τ
=
∂Sb
∂τ
− tb ∂m
∂τ
+ (k −m) ∂tb
∂τ
.
Performing the derivations yields
∂Wb
∂τ
=
τ [(k −m)k(2k + 2 + n) +m2(1− n)]− k(α− w)[(1− n)m+ n(k −m)]
β(k + 1)2
+
tb(2n− 1)(3k + 2)(α− w)
τ 2(6k + 5)
− (2n− 1)(k −m)(α− w − τ)[2(k + 1) + n(3k + 2)]
β(k + 1)2(6k + 5)
,
(A.3)
which again reduces to (29) when n = 0.5.
Evaluating (A.3) at τ˜ gives
∂Wb
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
τ˜
=
−(α− w)(2n− 1)Ωb
β(k + 1)2(6k + 5)
where
Ωb ≡ 24k
3 + 19k2 − 2k + 2(1− n)(8k + 9)(3k + 2)(8k2 + 8k −m)
4(8k + 11)
+
(3k + 2)
4
{
k[4(k + 1)(2n− 1) + n] + (2n− 1)(8k + 9)[2(k + 1) + n(3k + 2)]
(6k + 5)
}
+
(8k + 7)[2(k + 1) + n(3k + 2)](k −m)
8k + 11
.
Since Ωb > 0 from k > 1, n > 0.5 and k > m, it follows that ∂Wb/∂τ |τ˜ < 0, as stated
in (31).
Derivation of equation set (34)
We start from the following expressions for national welfare
Wa = Sa +Πa + λtam, Wb = Sb +Πb + λtb(k −m).
Substituting in from (10), (12) and (32) and evaluating all terms at n = 0.5 gives for
country i’s best response function (i, j ∈ {a, b}, i 6= j)
tiβ
8τ 2
[8λ(k + 1)− (2k + 1)] = k
2
[
λ− 1
2
− [2(α− w)− τ ]
4τ(k + 1)
]
+
tjβ
8τ 2
[4λ(k + 1)− (2k + 1)] .
Combining the two best responses and manipulating terms yields the Nash equilibrium
tax rates given in (34).
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